My conclusions are based on two areas of research. During the summer of 73 I was involved research work that involved the cataloging and photocopying of FDR�s personal papers that had been declassified during the previous year. (intern grunt work) My statements about British moral are based on the concerns the American diplomatic officers forwarded back to Washington. The repeated theme was a continuous concern for the Churchill camps ability to retain control of the government, reflecting the dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war. The low moral of the �common man� was often mentioned. And late in the war, the increasing number of labor strikes was seen as a warning sign, �indicating a rising popular movement in opposition of the war.�
The above quotes are as accurate as 30+ years of memory can make them. I have included the scanned text of an early letter that I retain a framed photo copy of. This theme was continuous for the duration of the war, with the exception that the estimates became almost bi-polar in late 44 early 45. No consensus being found among the American diplomats at that time. All of the documents are available at the FDR library, and a few of the vanilla ones are available on line. To its credit, the library resisted the cleansing of records that occurred during the mid to late nineties. Avoiding the scourge of missing indexed documents that now plagues the National Archives.
--------------------[quote]
London March 7, 1942.
Dear Mr. President:
I have been worried about the Prime Minister - both his political
status and his own spirits. He did not take well the criticism
he found on his return from Washington. The criticism was not
directed at him personally but against certain policies and against
various individuals. Unfortunately he bared his chest and assumed
the blame for everything
and everybody -politicians and soldiers alike. The natural effect
of this was to turn the criticism against himself.
He was forced, obviously reluctantly, to make changes, thus
failing o get full credit. He has, however, quieted things for
the present. His opponents have found that he has an Achilles
Heel and will undoubtedly attack again. It is curious how, when
criticism starts, a
coalition government suffers from lack of party loyalty and support.
Although the British are keeping a stiff upper lip, the surrender
of their troops at Singapore has shattered confidence to she
core - even in themselves but more particularly in their leaders.
They don't intend to take it lying down and I am satisfied we
will see the rebirth of greater determination. At the moment,
however, they can't see the end to defeats.
Unfortunately Singapore shook the Prime Minister himself to
such an extent that he has not been able to stand up in this
adversity with his old vigor.
A number of astute people, both friends and opponents, feel
it is only a question of a few months before his Government falls.
I cannot accept this view. He has been very tired but is better
in the Last day or two. I believe he will come back with renewed
strength, particularly when the tone of the war improves.
- 2 -
The President
March 7, 1942.
There is no other man in sight to give the British the leadership
Churchill does.
Cripps wears the hair shirt and wants everyone else to do
the same. The British are prepared to make any sacrifice to get
on with the war but are not interested in sacrifice for its own
sake. It has been proved that workmen need good food and entertainment
to keep up production over long periods. In his present position,
however, I believe that Cripps will do a lot of good in stiffening
things up.
Eden you know all about. Anderson is an uninspired, competent
technician. Bevin has never really risen above labor union politics.
And then we have Max| There is no one else on the horizon.
Now that the political storm has blown over, the Ministers
can give their full time to the war. There is no doubt the new
team will on balance be a big improvement over the old.
I find on my return even greater opportunity for usefulness
and deeply appreciative this opportunity you are giving me.
Sincerely,
Averell
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -[/q]
My statements on German atomic research are based on the work of David Irving and his work with the wire tap transcripts from Captured German Atomic scientists. His books are not in general circulation largely because they expose the illegal activities of the British government during this time and the Germans during the war. The second book not going to press because of pressure brought upon the publisher.
�IN 1993 David Irving completed work on an edition of the top-secret CSDIC interrogation transcripts on senior Nazi prisoners, and of the Farm Hall transcripts -- hidden-microphone recordings of the German atomic scientists in British captivity, the release of which he had campaigned for since 1967. German publisher Langen-M�ller Verlag, of Munich, who had commissioned the book, decided not to publish (senior editor Rochus von Zab�snig complained that it looked like "Nestbeschm�tzung", as some of the overheard remarks by Nazi prisoners like General Walter Bruns revealed unwelcome details of atrocities).�
Above quoted without permission of the Observer. [But I doubt they will ever read this
]
�The puzzle as to why the German atomic bomb program stalled has several overlapping explanations. Some of the best German physicists were Jewish and had been driven into exile, where many worked on the American or British atomic bomb programs. Nazi ideology had only scorn for "Jewish physics" and thus undervalued what theoretical physicists could contribute to the war effort. And as saturation bombing ravaged German cities, the Nazi industrial machine increasingly lacked the ability to mount a vast bomb development project to compete with the American Manhattan Project.
Still, it is clear that German physicists, for whatever reason, did fail to push hard enough to reach the goal. Some attribute that to surprising technical errors, like a grotesque overestimate of the amount of fissile material that was needed and a failure to realize that readily available graphite, if highly purified, could be used to moderate the atomic reaction instead of scarce, hard-to-get heavy water. Others blame arrogance and complacency on the part of German physicists who felt that if the job was hard for them, it would be impossible for the Allies. And some believe that there was a genuine reluctance to work on such an awesome weapon, either for moral reasons or for fear of failing and being blamed for a national defeat.
Recordings made surreptitiously of Heisenberg and other German scientists held in captivity after the German surrender show that they were stunned by news that the United States had exploded an atomic bomb over Hiroshima and refused to believe that it had actually been done. Even in these early recordings, one can discern the beginnings of a search for the moral high ground, as one German physicist contrasts the American development of "this ghastly weapon of war" with more peaceful nuclear reactor research under Hitler.�
This quote was from a historian named David Cassidy. IIRC All I retain is part of a news paper clipping. It would be from the Washington Post most likely, but could have also been from the NY Times.
My opinion is that the Americans knew that the Germans had a head start, this is documented, and assumed that the German scientists were able to do the math on the Uranium bomb just as they had done. Remember, no test of that device was required. It was the detonation engineering that needed to be tested on the plutonium bomb, and this is why the Nevada test occurred. We also knew that the Germans were working with uranium refinement at the beginning of the war, our Germans stated as much and this is documented. So, we had to assume that the Germans were as far along as we were and would have feared that they were ahead. Add to that the fact that Hitler was desperate and probably insane, and you have to consider that he would use the bomb as soon as it was ready.
David�s work can be down loaded as pdf files, just search his name.
As a side note, the Germans over-estimated the amount of material needed for a uranium bomb. They were in possession of more than enough by wars end. Only mismanagement prevented them from being able to field a crude device. The US captured enough uranium from the Germans (Japanese?) after Germany�s surrender, and after a small test of wills with the Canadians over who could get to it first. This is documented. It is said that the material went into the third bomb, which was not used, and also said that the material was not weapons grade. The mystery of the third bomb and what happened to it has never been declassified. Its target list was temporarily declassified a few years ago. The listing of Nagasaki as one of the primary targets indicates that the bomb was ready for use at or about the time of the second bombs use. Nagasaki was not the primary target for the second weapon.
Re: OT:splendid WWII movie you\'ll never see:(
Linear Mode
