Air Strikes

[RERomine]

Originally Posted by Marek_Tucan

As for CAS inaccuracy, I believe after bad experience from Normandy, one US inf. division declined any air support but observation planes. Though the worst incidents were I believe in the run-up to Cobra by heavy bombersw, but then there was this French town-that-I-cannot-recall-now where TacAir attacked what they thought to be a retreating German column and caused many US and civillian casaulties.

Now you are back to the reason why I pretty much avoid strike aircraft and use spotters.

[Mobhack]

Originally Posted by Marek_Tucan

Depends. Mostly on skill and circumstances - for example on Pacific islands Japanese sometimes used US aircrafts as cover and fired machineguns when masked by noise of a/c engines, thus also starting up paranoia about US fighters strafing own troops, this in turn leading to wild fires against anything int he air...

As for CAS inaccuracy, I believe after bad experience from Normandy, one US inf. division declined any air support but observation planes. Though the worst incidents were I believe in the run-up to Cobra by heavy bombersw, but then there was this French town-that-I-cannot-recall-now where TacAir attacked what they thought to be a retreating German column and caused many US and civillian casaulties.

By Normandy, British arty was firing "pink" missions 10,000 yds deep behind the front line or more. Everything on the far side of the pink smoke line was an air kill zone, anything seen there was considered fair game, no air strikes were allowed on our troops side. "Close" air support was therefore 10 clicks from the troops, and needed the arty batteries smoke marking to endure de-conflicting the fighters from friendly ground forces. The pilots found target discrimination exceedingly difficult to do, so marked kill zones was the way to go.

It was rare for a danger close (ie within 10000 yards of friendlies!) to be called, and if it was, it was under the personal observation of an air-ground "tentacle" team equiped with air frequencies radios with "eyes on" the enemy tiger or whatever, and he would talk each plane in individually, with lots of air recognition sheets, coloured smoke firing, flares etc used to mark friendlies.

Aircraft too close to own forces were dangerous things then, and still are today.

In any case anti-armour etc missions were not what air power was about. Aircraft targets are road convoys (to include AFV as bonus items) - but mainly to smash trucks and trains etc to flaming wrecks. Their anti-armour effect was therefore indirect as the supplies of POL, ammo and food petered out the clockwork mice stopped working. But this game is tactical, and so cannot represent the interdiction capability of air power that is its true strength. You would need an operational game at the division-sized counter level to properly model that IMHO.

One could model air superiority by an abstraction - but imagine the squeals from the German player when he was informed that due to the Allied air superiority (the USA guy bought a squillion P47 and assigned them to pre-game interdiction), half his shiny Tiger 2s will not be allowed to arrive on the battlefield since they are stuck in a traffic jam of pulverised scrap metal that used to be the supply trucks in Falaise and 3 were considered killed on the approach march. Plus everyone else has only half the ammo because of said supply trucks being toast, and D company has -1 on its morale due to the field kitchen failing to deliver a hot breakfast since the bread oven is now a .50 cal colander..

Cheers
Andy

[Marek_Tucan]

What was I wondering about: How often were the aircrafts used to attack artillery positions?

As for "danger close", I believe those missions were fairly regular during pre-planned massive ops (like Market-Garden, though there they were mostly in potentia due to defects in communications etc) but then the planes were to attack specified targets (IIRC colored smoke shells were the norm). And most of the "spectacular" friendly fire incidents (air-to-ground) happened during highly mobile battles where frontlines were unclear (Guderian was almost killed in a Stuka attack in France 1940, Mac Arthur's car was almost attacked by a Lightning on Luzon in 1945).
The situation you describe (with kill zone >10km from own lines) would be most likely applied to more "static" periods, right?

Just for the record I think that the situation you describe above would be funny as hell and that adding similar randomness to the game would be great, but probably not worth the efforts and inevitable complaints, even if possible (having to tackle C spaghetti here and there, though not on a daily basis, my appreciation for it grows )
As for the effect on tanks, IIRC there was an "online interview" with DAK Tiger veteran major (living in the US, discovered by a model/books store owner which he visited) who described the drill during air raid. Cars: leave road, crew+passengers jump out to cover. Tanks: button up and continue driving.

[Cross]

Although aircraft were more likely to target the more visible and vulnerable convoys, planes were sometimes used to attack armour with surprisingly good results.

The Stuka (Junkers 87) would, even in 1940, dive on and drop bombs on individual tanks with amazing accuracy. Later in 1943/44 when the 87D was first fitted with 37mm cannons, I read that they KO dozens of Russian tanks in a single day.

I guess in our battalion level tactical battles, we are more likely to use aircraft in their less common close support role, even though they belong in a battle of larger scope.

But I wouldn't change a thing. Air attacks - and the realistic chances of 'friendly fire' - bring another dimension to the fun.

[chuckfourth]

Originally Posted by hoplitis

And while we are on the "blue on blue" airstrike issue, what about the reverse situation ie "blue on blue" antiair fire?
Was it common?
Should it be included in the game (if it was an issue in wwII)?
(Ok stop throwing eggs!)

Id second that, cant get enough of that blue on blue. Im pretty sure afer a severe staffing most gunners would be tempted to fire first and ask questions later.
Best Regards Chuck.

[RERomine]

Here's another air strike question. Has anyone ever seen the AI target it's own units? I'm sure there might be instances where they inflicted some collateral damage on their own units by targeting enemy units nearby, but I'm wondering if the AI is at the same risk of accidently bombing their own units.

[narwan]

Yeah, often in fact.

[gila]

Originally Posted by narwan

Yeah, often in fact.

Agreed..If their units are close the bombing sector

[PanzerBob]

Originally Posted by Cross

Having said I mostly pick targets behind the main line of resistance, I should point out that I still find aircraft a well worth while investment. Finding choice targets aways from friendly units, is not all that difficult.

I often purchase two or more aircraft, and usually find I get my moneys worth, once you factor in the additional intel gained, and the psychological/harassing effect it has on your opponent.

In my most recent battle, a pair of Mossies slightly damaged the only two Tigers on the battlefield, immobolised a Pz III and I think damaged an APC. One of the Mosquitos did get damaged by AAA and had to RTB.

Yes, Colonel your airstrikes were quite unnerving, and gave one an appreciation of why a lot of photos of Panzer Crews showed them searching the skies!!

Bob out

[Mobhack]

Originally Posted by Cross

Although aircraft were more likely to target the more visible and vulnerable convoys, planes were sometimes used to attack armour with surprisingly good results.

The Stuka (Junkers 87) would, even in 1940, dive on and drop bombs on individual tanks with amazing accuracy. Later in 1943/44 when the 87D was first fitted with 37mm cannons, I read that they KO dozens of Russian tanks in a single day.

I guess in our battalion level tactical battles, we are more likely to use aircraft in their less common close support role, even though they belong in a battle of larger scope.

But I wouldn't change a thing. Air attacks - and the realistic chances of 'friendly fire' - bring another dimension to the fun.

I cannot recall the title of the publication I picked up at Duxford a couple of years back, but it was based on the Allied operations research group reports into air effectiveness during and after Normandy. Been a couple of years since I read it, but as I recollect:

Most air strikes did not actually destroy heavy panzers. The German crews would however tend to bail from theoretically "immune" MBT that air weapons really had no great chance on and cower in cover nearby - where they were sometimes killed by the strafing. Panzers were sometimes found unmanned, with the engines running after Allied troops overran an area that had been recently struck by air.

Although the tanks were relatively immune from air strikes (.50 and 20 mm were really ineffective vs heavy armour and bomb or rocket hits were rather unlikely), the few that were directly hit by bombs or rockets tended to be destroyed, esp by 60 pounder rockets. The crews therefore preferred to take their chances in the ditch alongside when being strafed, or would charge off the road into cover and then bail from the vehicle. They would often bail on the aircraft starting their attacks, long before the actual MG fire started. It could take a half an hour or more after the air strike before all crews were re-mounted and the surviving tanks were marshalled back into order and the column proceeded once more.

Troops did not become "blase" after suffering from several air strikes - unlike getting used to regular shelling. Rather they became more "twitchy" in response to air strikes the more that they experienced them in their careers.

The armour that was destroyed was the open-topped and thin skinned half tracks, scout cars and tank destroyers.

The real damage was done on soft transport, which air attacks reduced to bent bits of scrap metal. Abandoned panzers were often found on roads in the bocage (esp Falaise) in the midst of a sea of mangled soft-skin vehicle wreckage that they simply could not extract themselves from.

It seems that troops under air attack have a different experience from those under arty bombardment. Shelling is relatively impersonal. However troops under air attack feel that the plane is directing the fire at them personally, so the shock to morale is much greater. Like the difference between general rifle fire and being personally sniped at with aimed rifle fire.

So - as an anti-armour weapon planes were a "terror" item. Real killing was done on the soft MT carrying the tanks bullets, bombs and beans. The AT effect of air power was therefore an indirect one over time as the "clockwork" of the armoured units wound down due to lack of logistical support from the MT. Just like the USN concentration (esp by the sub force) on tankers stopped the IJN's clockwork too.

Cheers
Andy