Units used in the LZ_X-ray battle

[Listy]

Pyros said:
What about this modification for the simulation of ARAs?

For the ARA Helicopters, I propose a modified UH-1B SS-11, with weapons configurations 4 slots of 4 x 2.75in FFAR, correct ammo to simulate a load of 48 rockets and a slightly modified Fire control, Range finder and Rate of Fire (in order to simulate better the lethality of the ARAs).

I used a UH-1 gunship, with the above (the correct ammo load out is 3).

[Pyros]

The difference between the 2x 2.75in FFAR and 2x 2.75in FFAR is just the valye HE Kill from 15 (for 2x) to 20 (for 4x). So it may be better to use 4 slots of 2x 2.75in FFAR with 6 ammo each.

But again, since this will be a modification and the scope is to achieve the historical lethality of the ARA units... we could make accept a model of 4 slots of 4 x 2.75in FFAR with 6 ammo.
This should be decided from playtesting and the it is a way to strenghten the efficiency of the FFAR by modeling that the 4x 2.75in FFAR is only firing 1 tube per shot

Concerning the Gunship model for modification if we adopt the UH-1B gunship will use the wrong sounds for the weapon slots 1 & 2 (MG), on the other hand the UH-1B SS-11 is using "rocket sounds".

The latest test that I conduct is with modified Hogs against Regional NVA units on clear terrain.
My goal is to achieve a good model of ARA from a firing distance of 3-4 Hexes 150-200 meters.
So far a unit with control & range finder set to a value of 30 has as a result that it will inflict 1-2 casualties from a distance of 3-4 hexes (stabilize 5-10).
Also, I have set the ammo to 12 (in order to simulate that each shot is one tube).

[Listy]

48 Rockets, Divided by the number of weapon slots (4), divided by the number of Rockets per weapon (4).

Thats how I came up with the HE ammo of 3.

As I said A new OOB with the right unit added would be the best answer.

In my tests I tried it on VC dug in, in a wood hex. The aim was to pin the enemy.

Note: How does the spalsh damage effect the weapon? I only tested in the old version.

[Pyros]

Odly enough I haven't seen any splash damage in my tests...

The logical ammo allocation is 48 divide by 4 slots =12
and then (weapon slot) 12 divided by (number of tubes) 4 = 3 as you correctly stated.
But the point is that I find that the rockets should be more powerful (at least shooting at an NVA platoon [not pinned on clear terrain] from a distance of 3-4 hexes should make 1 kill, so since we use the stock US OOB, then a way to magnify (4x) the efficiency of the FFARs is by assuming that each salvo of an 4x 2.75in FFAR is only one Tube (instead of 4)

[Listy]

Not in my estimation.

Each Hex is about 2500 square meter's (50x50). Each salvo fires 16 rockets. That's roughly 1 rocket for every 156 meter's of terrain, throw in tree's, and Fox holes and you'll see what I mean.

From my understanding, ARA and the Gunships where used to pin the enemy, While the Huey's where landing the troops. That is the point of maximum danger as the troops are bunched up together, and a Huey killed on the LZ will lower the amount of traffic the LZ can handle.

The Idea with the ARA's and gunships seems to be to throw as much lead into the tree line as possible to make anyone covering the LZ to keep his head down long enough to get the UH-1's in and unloaded.

[Pyros]

David,

We will better decide this while playtesting the scenarios.

Just keep in mind that the existing UH-1B Gunship with a seven-tube (if it is based on the 7-tube) 2.75 inch rocket launcher is simulated in the game as a pair of 2x 2.75in FFAR with ammo of 9.
This makes a total of 2 x 2 x 9 = 36 rockets instead of 14 rockets that should theoretically be.

Anyway, it is much better to decide these issues as an overal gaming experience.

cheers,
Pyros

[Pyros]

David this could be interesting (FFAR warhead):
Upon detonation, the warhead fragments into thousands of small, high velocity fragments. The bursting radius is 10 meters; however, high velocity fragments can produce a lethality radius in excess of 50 meters.


Here is info concerning the ordnance of the attack heli on the LZ X-ray battle

Eight-tube Rocket Launcher. Two eight-tube 2.75 inch rocket launchers were installed on new UH-1B Hueys as they arrived at Camp Holloway, Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam from late 1963-1964. This system, a predecessor to the XM3 armament subsystem, was used in combination with the M6 7.62mm quad-machine gun mount. For more information and photos, go to Armament Subsystems used at Camp Holloway, Pleiku, 1963-1964.


M16 Armament Subsystem (1963-1972). The M16 was a combination of M6 flexible quad M60C 7.62mm machine guns and two XM157 or M158/M158A1 seven-tube 2.75 inch rocket launchers for use with the UH-1B/UH-1C "Huey". The M16 was upgraded to the M21 by up-gunning from quad M60C machine guns to M134 high rate of fire machine guns. An M60A1 reflex-type sight was used by the pilot for sighting both guns and rockets. The copilot's sight was for sighting guns only. The M16 was type classified Standard B (461 units were built).
M16 quad M60C machine gun mount with XM157 launcher on HU-1B "Huey"


M21 Armament Subsystem (1964-1975). The UH-1B/UH-1C/UH-1M "Huey" could be armed with twin side mounting 7.62mm "miniguns" and two XM157 or two M158/M158A1 seven-tube 2.75 inch rocket launchers on the Emerson M21 armament subsystem. The M21 was an up-gunned M16 which used M134 "miniguns" in place of quad M60C machine guns. The M134 used a MAU-56/A delinking feeder. The pilot used a XM60 reflex-type sight for both guns and rockets. The copilot used a flexible reflex sight which depressed or flexed the "miniguns" only. The M21 was type classified Standard A (over 406 units were built).
XM21 armament subsystem with XM157 launcher (with M6 quad M60C machine gun mount)





XM3/XM3E1/M3 Armament Subsystem . UH-1B/UH-1C "Huey" Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARAs) were armed with up to two side-mounting 24-tube 2.75 inch rocket launchers on the M3 armament subsystem. The MK8 reflex sight was used for sighting the M3 rocket launchers. The M3 saw limited production. Also see the Maxwell system (XM3/M22 hybrid) and Armament Subsystems used at Camp Holloway, Pleiku, 1963-1964.
UH-1B ARA with XM3 24-tube 2.75 inch rocket launcher
UH-1B armed with XM3 armament subsystem (Source US Army AMCOM)


concerning the lethality of the 2.75in Rocket I have found this:

The M151 HE Warhead is the 10-pound anti-personnel warhead -- traditionally referred to as the "10 Pounder" -- which was designed and developed by the Army and is currently in production. It consists of two main parts, the nose and the base, which are welded (brazed) together. The bulk of the lethality is obtained from the nose section which is fabricated using nodular, pearlitic malleable cast iron. The nose end of the warhead is threaded to receive the M423 Fuze. The M151 can be used M423, M429, and M433 fuzes. The base section is fabricated using steel or cast iron and is threaded for attachment to the rocket motor. The total weight of the loaded, unfuzed, warhead is 8.7 pounds (3.85 kg), of which 2.3 pounds (1.04 kg) is composition B-4 High Explosive (HE). Upon detonation, the warhead fragments into thousands of small, high velocity fragments. The bursting radius is 10 meters; however, high velocity fragments can produce a lethality radius in excess of 50 meters. Temperature limits for storage and firing the M151 are -65 F to +150 F.

[Pyros]

Captain Ed W. Freeman, United States Army, distinguished himself by numerous acts of conspicuous gallantry and extraordinary intrepidity on 14 November 1965 while serving with Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). As a flight leader and second in command of a 16-helicopter lift unit, he supported a heavily engaged American infantry battalion at Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam. The infantry unit was almost out of ammunition after taking some of the heaviest casualties of the war, fighting off a relentless attack from a highly motivated, heavily armed enemy force. When the infantry commander closed the helicopter landing zone due to intense direct enemy fire, Captain Freeman risked his own life by flying his unarmed helicopter through a gauntlet of enemy fire time after time, delivering critically needed ammunition, water, and medical supplies to the besieged battalion. His flights had a direct impact on the battle's outcome by providing the engaged units with timely supplies of ammunition critical to their survival, without which they would almost surely have experienced a much greater loss of life. After medical evacuation helicopters refused to fly into the area due to intense enemy fire, Captain Freeman flew 14 separate rescue missions, providing life-saving evacuation of an estimated 30 seriously wounded soldiers -- some of whom would not have survived had he not acted. All flights were made into a small emergency landing zone within 100 to 200 meters (2-4 hexes) of the defensive perimeter where heavily committed units were perilously holding off the attacking elements. Captain Freeman�s selfless acts of great valor, extraordinary perseverance, and intrepidity were far above and beyond the call of duty or mission and set a superb example of leadership and courage for all of his peers. Captain Freeman�s extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army.

228th ASHB was the 1st Cavalry Division's Chinook Battalion. The Bn had three companies of CH-47 aircraft. Each company had 16 "Hooks." The Battalion Headquarters (HHC) had a UH-1D/H "Slick" and one OH-6A "Loach." Guns-A-Go-Go was originally the 53rd Aviation Detachment and became the 1st Aviation Detachment when it was assigned to the
1st Cavalry Division in November 1966

[Pyros]

Preparatory phase
The aerial artillery came on the heels of the tube artillery fire and worked over the area for 30 seconds expending half their load, then went into a orbit nearby to be on call. The lift battalion gunships took up the fire and were immediately ahead of the troop transport Hueys.

Close Air Support by 7th air force's 1st commando
Strikes in support of ground operations in Ia Drang

740 CAS sorties were flown, mainly in support of LZ X Ray and Albany.
Air Force tactical air provided continuous support with a fighter bomber on a target run on an average of once every fifteen minutes;
- A-4 Skyhawks
- A-37 Dragonfly
- F-4 Phantoms
- A-1 Skyraider
- AC-47 "Dragonship"
- AC-119 "Stinger"
- AC-130 "Spectre"
- F-100 Super Sabre
- B-52 (Modified for conventional bombs)

[B-52 missions[/b]

Five B-52 missions with 96 sorties were flown.

The most devastating support was provided by B-52 bombers which struck without warning six kilometers west of X-RAY. Though the bombers had been employed initially in Vietnam some six months earlier, this was their first use in direct support of U.S. troops on a tactical operation. For the next five days, the big bombers systematically bombed large areas of the Chu Pong Massif.

Quantity of Air and Arty support in the final stage of the battle

Then, after his soldiers marked their units� positions, he ordered strikes by over two dozen aircraft and called on the fires of four batteries of artillery.

ARA

It consisted of three firing batteries, each equipped with twelve Huey helicopters armed with 2.75-inch aerial rockets.

In his after action report, Colonel Moore noted that aerial rocket artillery had been extremely effective. His commanders had confidence in bringing such fires extremely close to their own positions. He also had noted that tube artillery, aerial rocket artillery, and tactical air can be used at the same time without seriously downgrading the effectiveness of the fire or endangering the aircraft. The aerial rocket artillery and Tactical Air flew perpendicular to the artillery gun-target line in those cases when they were making a simultaneous attack on the same target areas. This technique was possible by close teamwork between the forward air controller and the artillery liaison officer.

[Pyros]

Before the attack began Batteries A and C, 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, were deployed at LZ FALCON.
These Batteries fired over 4,000 rounds of high-explosive ammunition during the night of 14/11 in close support of X-RAY.

To provide additional artillery support, Landing Zone COLUMBUS was established 4 1/2 kilometers to the northeast of X-RAY. This landing zone was midway between X-RAY and FALCON, where Batteries A and C of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, were located. Battery B of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, and Battery C of the 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery, were now moved into COLUMBUS.

The enemy broke contact and filtered back into the mountains after suffering tremendous losses. He was pursued with heavy firepower: cannon artillery continually pounded the area;

The division fired 40,464 artillery rounds and rockets during the campaign.

The artillerymen had learned much from this campaign. First, the concept of displacing and supplying artillery by air was proved valid, particularly in support of an airmobile force. During the campaign, artillery units of the cavalry division artillery had made a total of 79 tactical moves-67 of them by air. Continuous air movement by maneuver and support forces unsettled the enemy. Properly executed airmobile operations could keep constant pressure on him, wearing him down and destroying his will to resist. Second, aerial rocket artillery was shown to be extremely responsive and effective in augmenting cannon fires. Ground forces learned that aerial rocket artillery was reliable and extremely accurate, characteristics that were particularly important in close support missions. By controlling helicopter fires through artillery fire support channels, as was done with aerial rocket artillery, cannon and helicopter fires could be closely coordinated by a single individual, thus insuring that both were complementary. Third, artillerymen learned of the necessity of having artillery positions that were mutually supporting. Though Landing Zone COLUMBUS had stood off an enemy attack without mutually supporting artillery, its defenders had required air support, which in poor weather might not have been available. Fourth, because of the rugged terrain and dense foliage, target acquisition was a definite problem. Forward observers were still the best means of target acquisition because they were always with maneuver companies. To augment the forward observers, aerial observers were added whenever possible and were particularly effective in support of overland ground movements. Fifth, it was shown that the 105-mm. howitzer was a particularly good weapon for reconnaissance by fire. As the unit moved, the artillery forward observer would adjust artillery rounds in advance of the unit. This provided two benefits: the artillery could disrupt any activity or ambush site the enemy might have, and the location of the last round fired was a good indicator of the unit's location. This second advantage would allow for rapid delivery of artillery in the event the enemy ambushed the ground force.