Re: Weapons accuracy
The OR guys analysing air strikes after Normandy found that the main effect on armoured units was the sheer panic disorganisation that the strike would cause to the march column. The tankers would charge full speed offroad into the bushes or simply bail from the tanks and take cover in roadside ditches - where they were in more danger from the strafing, really.
Intuitively they knew that if they stayed buttoned up then they were likely to survive, but enough of them had seen or knew of someone who talked about having seen what a (rare) direct bomb or rocket hit did. So they were not willing to take any chances and saw evasion as the key. Basic human psycology at work.
It took a fair amount of time post strike to get the rabbits back in thier hutches and all pointed in the same direction. Plus rapid turns off-road would throw tracks or have tanks falling into roadside ditches etc, and some injuries to be dealt with from the avoidance - add a few casualties from flying bits of metal on tankies cowering in the ditches or behind roadside walls etc.
The real "killing" effect of air strikes on armour were when the logistics train got brewed up, then the clockwork mice eventually stopped running without the loggies around.
They found some tanks post-Falaise gap air strikes (and/or massed arty) that had been left abandoned with motors idling in the bocage high-sided lanes as they were completely surrounded by a wire tangle of mangled trucks and howitzers, dead horsed transports etc which the tanks simply could not actually cross. (Piano wire used in Italian vineyards was also a surprising tank-sticker. It wrapped round the sprockets like an old rope does for a boat's propellor.)
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