The Tank is dead

[Suhiir]

Originally Posted by DRG

This was posted in the past but it's still a "fun" read......I especially like the 5 gal gas can in front of the claymore....nasty

Frankly I'm not sure that one would work on a modern MBT. The claymore is useless, and even if all 5 gal of gas hit the tank I doubt a fire on the outside would do much good.

Now pour your gas into the engine compartment and you'll probably at least immobilize it as the insulation is burnt off the wiring and it shorts out. But standing on the rear deck of a tank holding a 5 gal gas can doesn't sound to healthy to me unless you've stripped it of infantry support.

[DRG]

I was thinking more of those pesky support infantry that you need to deal with before the tank. The only thing that combination going off near a tank would do would make everyone inside it...glad they were inside it........

[jp10]

But there is a crew in that MBT and vehicle crews do not like anything burning on the vehicle. The firemore will remove supporting troops, restrict vision by causing fire/smoke to surrounding terrain. It is best to disrupt C3 and close a route, causing the vehicles to detour into your planned kill zone.

You don't have to get on the deck, open can, drop in grenade, throw it on the deck. Works best as a two man team unless you tape the spoon with one strip of duct tape to make a delayed release.

The book is cute but the best secret tricks do not translate into Winsp game play.

[IronDuke99]

In case I was not clear I believe the tank is very far from dead and was trying to make that point.

Below is a very interesting link from the recent UK Royal United Services Institute conference (one of many interesting talks from this conference) I direct readers to the second speaker from 22 minutes in.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tIg3LkAYNKM

He is talking about current war in Ukraine and Russian forces.

Lots of tanks, lots and lots of powerful artillery, very effective area air denial via SAMS, etc, trenches, and a lot of electronic warfare/jamming too.

The Russians have always been an Artillery army, it was their best arm even as far back as the Napoleonic era. In munitions terms whereas the West has gone increasingly precision, the Russians have gone for mass effect.

The Area air denial -if it works against the latest Western aircraft- really would be a game changer, since I strongly suspect Western forces will suffer more from the loss of air support than Russian style forces would, especially in the face of a very powerful enemy artillery.

From a British Army point of view I would say the lesson would be don't, under almost any circumstances, be fighting Russia in Eastern Europe, as a single Armoured Division (and that is the most UK is going to be able to generate for the foreseeable future) however well equipped and trained, is pretty much useless for that type of warfare in that type of theatre. Although, of course, it might be very useful indeed, elsewhere.

[IronDuke99]

One further point on my last post. The gentleman speaking in the video, a former Royal Marine, suggested that area air denial could lead to even Western troops getting as little as 20% of expected air support or less.

The F35 (initially supposed to be an affordable multi-role aircraft) has a flyway cost that is never likely to be much less than US $100-120 million per single aircraft, depending on it being an 'A', 'B' or 'C'. Add to that the cost of often very expensive Western Precision guided munitions and, of course, an expensively trained pilot.

F35 has, mainly frontal arc, stealth technology (if it carries no external weapons, that means it cannot, even when based relatively close to the enemy, as in on a Carrier, carry a great deal).

Now I ask people to consider, in terms of simple common sense, what level of losses would be acceptable with this, very expensive, aircraft. Or, to put it another way, how good does an area air denial SAM system need to be before using F35, and losing some, becomes a game not worth the candle?

Lets say, for the sake of argument, a F35, loaded with smart weapons and an experienced pilot is worth $150 million (strictly just in money terms). Is an objective worth, perhaps, losing one? Three, five or even ten of them? Is that likely to include supporting an infantry company? Me, I have my doubts.

Doubts made stronger by hearing Crab (sorry RAF) officers talking about going 'down town' in F35 ( as a mere trog I always thought that term had very little to do with doing CAS, but a great deal to do with the old RAF 'independent air force' story).
Just some thoughts.

[Suhiir]

Given the expectations from Gulf-I it appears 25% losses in the initial strike to suppress opposition air defenses was considered high, but acceptable. After that initial strike I'd guess no more then 10%.

With the stealth, stand-off weapons, and smaller numbers of aircraft currently in use I'd suspect maybe half those numbers.

So in theory 5-10 days after the initial strike air losses could equal about 50% of the starting aircraft. At that point I'd suspect only high value missions would be undertaken so ground support for anything but a major attack/defense would be essentially nonexistent. Of course this assumes opposition air defense has not been eliminated or suppressed to the point of being noneffective.

[IronDuke99]

Originally Posted by Suhiir

Given the expectations from Gulf-I it appears 25% losses in the initial strike to suppress opposition air defenses was considered high, but acceptable. After that initial strike I'd guess no more then 10%.

With the stealth, stand-off weapons, and smaller numbers of aircraft currently in use I'd suspect maybe half those numbers.

So in theory 5-10 days after the initial strike air losses could equal about 50% of the starting aircraft. At that point I'd suspect only high value missions would be undertaken so ground support for anything but a major attack/defense would be essentially nonexistent. Of course this assumes opposition air defense has not been eliminated or suppressed to the point of being noneffective.

Interesting thoughts. I doubt too much will change v Third world and non State forces (at least until they can get their hands on more modern Chinese and Russian kit in the form of area SAMS, etc).

But I am sure you are about right if facing the likes of a major Chinese or Russian force.

In terms of UK forces the British Army really lacks any kind of area air defence right now (Rapier is getting very long in the tooth and lacks range), although RN Type 45 Destroyers could probably provide some in littoral operations.

On a more directly related to this thread point the British Army also lacks any kind of ATGM under armour at the moment, and that is something they surely do need to fix for the proposed mobile 'Strike' brigades to make much sense.

[Suhiir]

I think the "West" assumes air superiority so area air defense systems aren't a real priority. And to be honest since that has always been the case since about 1942 I can see why. One could argue if that would have been true had there been a NATO vs Warsaw Pact war, but since it never happened we'll never know.

I do think that the US in particular tends to neglects local air defense as well. Stingers are all well and fine but there are never enough of them around to deal with more then 4-6 (if that many) aircraft/helos.

The only ATGM under armor the USMC has ever had is the LAV-AT (we'll discount the "armored" HUMMWVs), and that's more of a side effect of wanting ATGM's that could keep up with the LAV units. Since the advent of the ATGM equipped Attack Helicopter the USMC has tended to rely on them as it's primary anti-armor system. One could argue if that's a good idea or not, but again, up until this point it has worked just fine.

[IronDuke99]

Originally Posted by Suhiir

I think the "West" assumes air superiority so area air defense systems aren't a real priority. And to be honest since that has always been the case since about 1942 I can see why. One could argue if that would have been true had there been a NATO vs Warsaw Pact war, but since it never happened we'll never know.

I do think that the US in particular tends to neglects local air defense as well. Stingers are all well and fine but there are never enough of them around to deal with more then 4-6 (if that many) aircraft/helos.

The only ATGM under armor the USMC has ever had is the LAV-AT (we'll discount the "armored" HUMMWVs), and that's more of a side effect of wanting ATGM's that could keep up with the LAV units. Since the advent of the ATGM equipped Attack Helicopter the USMC has tended to rely on them as it's primary anti-armor system. One could argue if that's a good idea or not, but again, up until this point it has worked just fine.

Agree with everything you say. Two things I have heard current British Army types most wanting (besides a pay raise) is some sort of area SAM and some sort of ATGM under armour to support Warrior, etc.

For myself, I worry a bit that the whole light armoured, 8x8 APC thing has become very overblown. Light armour is useful if you are fighting a second or third rate enemy, - ie, South Africa v Cuba and Angola 1987-88- especially if you can move it, in useful numbers, quickly by air. Other than that, training etc being roughly equal, it is worse, in most respects, than having heavier armour.

So given they could put a low velocity 90mm gun on a Scorpion/Scimitar CVR(T) 'light tank' export varient, why not put the excellent 40mm gun from Ajax and Warrior 2000 on something like Scimitar Mk2 rather than a big heavy Ajax that is next to non air portable?

What I suspect is it was about 'force protection', especially from IED's that ends up giving one a over large and heavy Ajax that is neither fish nor fowl and does not deliver a whole lot that Warrior 2000 does not provide, beyond the ability for it to be crewed by the Royal Armoured Corps (ie, the Cavalry and the Royal Tank Regiment)...

[Suhiir]

Originally Posted by IronDuke99

For myself, I worry a bit that the whole light armoured, 8x8 APC thing has become very overblown. Light armour is useful if you are fighting a second or third rate enemy, - ie, South Africa v Cuba and Angola 1987-88- especially if you can move it, in useful numbers, quickly by air. Other than that, training etc being roughly equal, it is worse, in most respects, than having heavier armour.

So given they could put a low velocity 90mm gun on a Scorpion/Scimitar CVR(T) 'light tank' export varient, why not put the excellent 40mm gun from Ajax and Warrior 2000 on something like Scimitar Mk2 rather than a big heavy Ajax that is next to non air portable?

What I suspect is it was about 'force protection', especially from IED's that ends up giving one a over large and heavy Ajax that is neither fish nor fowl and does not deliver a whole lot that Warrior 2000 does not provide, beyond the ability for it to be crewed by the Royal Armoured Corps (ie, the Cavalry and the Royal Tank Regiment)...

It really comes down to - "Are they APCs or IFVs?"

If you try to make every vehicle an IFV of course you're going to have mass and firepower issues. The only time the USMC had an IFV was late WW II/Korea with the amphibious "tanks" made out of LVT3s and 4s, and even those didn't carry troops they only operated in close support of them.

With the current world situation of "low intensity" conflicts vs guerilla type forces IEDs have become the major casualty inflictor and thus the "need" for transports that are less vulnerable to them. But that of course means more mass and since it's now capable of withstanding mines and small arms it needs a weapon capable of taking out it's equal.

I totally agree a 40mm AGL or 25-30mm chaingun is more then adaquite to the task, I've never really seen the need for a 50/75/90mm weapon in the first place. Too small to deal with real tanks, larger then needed to deal with APC/IFVs.