Iraqi MBT and APC losses 1991 and 2003

[Taskforce]

I've been looking for a source on the internet that says roughly how many MBTs and APCs Iraq lost during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, but none is to be found. And how many roughly should be remaining in service.

Does anyone have any good info regarding this?

Cheers, Taskforce

[Marcello]

As far as I can tell it is currently in iraqi army service from the pre 2003 equipment.
1)One hundred of Type 69 and similar.
2)A few tens of T-72 (possibly).
3)Seventy or so MT-LB.
4)Thirty something EE-9.
5)Several battalions worth of artillery systems (D-30, Type 83,M46 GHN45, BM-21 etc.).
To this it must be added the equipment in kurdish service.
I doubt that there are sources on GW1/OIF losses that can be trusted. Iraqi paperwork might have been lost or be unreliable and after 2003 th circumtances were not conductive to beancounting.
At best you might get an estimate of what the coalition thought it had destroyed.

[FASTBOAT TOUGH]

Marcello brings up a good point. These are more about cause and effect then numbers, but I'll see what I can come up with. I feel these would be of some use to you scenario and campaign folks as well. The first is very detailed from Stephen Biddle a very well respected analyst. The second comes from the independent Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the U.S. Army. It's the study of the Battle of 73 Easting JANUS simulation that took into account the individual actions of all enemy and friendly individual units actions etc. as noted below from ref 1.
http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html
The (#) footnotes provide very valuble information where indicated in the above ref.

"The 73 Easting Project is a collaborative study conducted jointly by the independent Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the U.S. Army. Its purpose was to develop a data base of unprecedented detail on the conduct of a single battle (the "Battle of 73 Easting"), then to use modern computer simulation technology to represent that data in a "virtual re-creation" of the minute-to-minute activities of each participating tank, armored vehicle, truck, or infantry team.(14) The resulting data provides an important resource in itself. But the unique strength of the 73 Easting analysis is the power that computer simulation provides to conduct controlled experiments by changing key characteristics of the historical event, then re-fighting the simulated battle and observing directly the effects on the putative outcome. This makes it possible to test alternative cause-and-effect hypotheses with especially thorough, systematic counterfactual analysis.(15)"
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA257266

At the end of the above ref. a table shows the Iraqi losses at 73Easting. Both the battle with unit make up.

These look at the reasons for the high Iraqi losses and the U.S. and allied lack there of. Later and newer analysis would later support many if not most of the conclusions drawn in the first ref. It is clear that Iraq did not learn the lessons from the "First Gulf War" in preparing for and while fighting the "Second Gulf War".

Regards,
Pat

[FASTBOAT TOUGH]

Just missed the edit window try this for perspective from osd.mil
http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/timeline/fast_facts.htm
A little more conservative number then most. For instance in armored units most are closer to ~4000 units lost. Total number showing of what they had prior seems consistent with other sources though.

Regards,
Pat

[Taskforce]

Thanks both of you! :-)

I was asking myself that question since I want to keep my Operation Iraqi Freedom AAR realistic, and to do that I have to restrict the Iraqi access to tanks from April 2003 or something like that, so that I don't encounter huge numbers of Iraqi tanks when they in reality hardly had any.

Cheers, Taskforce

[Marcello]

Originally Posted by Taskforce

Thanks both of you! :-)

I was asking myself that question since I want to keep my Operation Iraqi Freedom AAR realistic, and to do that I have to restrict the Iraqi access to tanks from April 2003 or something like that, so that I don't encounter huge numbers of Iraqi tanks when they in reality hardly had any.

Cheers, Taskforce

Note that the numbers I posted refer to what is operational (or was the last year). That means basically what was in working conditions or could be made so with limited efforts and was felt to be useful. Large amounts of equipment that survived combat after 1991 were taken out of service due to lack of spares and such. A lot of equipment that survived the 2003 war was disposed of. No doubt the iraqi army was understrenght but the armored component was still non trivial.

[Suhiir]

Estimated Iraqi Losses Reported by U.S. Central Command, March 7, 1991

36 fixed-wing aircraft in air-to-air engagements
6 helicopters in air-to-air engagements
68 fixed- and 13 rotary-wing aircraft destroyed on the ground
137 Iraqi aircraft flown to Iran
3,700 of 4,280 battle tanks
2,400 of 2,870 assorted other armored vehicles
2,600 of 3,110 assorted artillery pieces
19 naval ships sunk, 6 damaged
42 divisions made combat-ineffective

################################################## ###############

I'd be VERY leery about the tank/armored vehicle/artillery losses reported.
It's nearly impossible for a pilot to notice the tank he is killing is already dead. So the same tank often gets killed over and over.
My rule of thumb it to cut aircraft reported kills by 66%.