[Thermodyne]

Originally posted by Alpha Kodiak:
From what I understand, their were two M1s damaged by WGMs similar in class to TOWs mounted on the back of flat bed trucks. I assume this is one of them. I don't think the trucks survived the return fire nearly as well....

What has happened to the M1 tanks in Iraq is a short fall in the tactics, not a weakness in the tank. The M1 was developed to kill Soviet armor from long range while moving at high speed. And to deal with Soviet infantry by killing their personnel carriers before the infantry dismounts. The Soviet battle plan calls for units to dive forward until halted by combat, then to stand aside and let the unit directly in trail to move forward and continue the advance. American order of battle was to kill and displace, to buy time and delay the advance, not stop it. This was designed as a combined arms engagement with air power, TOW and Dragon anti-armor weapons and tank engagements that were quick long range fights. The M1 was not designed to fight dismounted infantry. And it is poorly suited for stationary slow moving fights against these forces. The doctrine would be to blow past these guys and attack the areas to their rear, leaving them to be dealt with by our infantry. These tanks are being de-tracked by shoulder fired RPG�s and possibly by some sight guided anti armor missiles. Their defense against this is open country speed, which they do not have in these small towns. And will not have in Baghdad. In an urban fight, the tank becomes self propelled artillery. At close quarters in a stationary fight, I could have a troop of girl scouts ready to de-track tanks in about half an hour. The problem is that de-tracking does not kill the tank, so if you loose the ground, then you get to fight the same tank again the next day.

To put this in perspective, the damaging of 5 tanks in a two hundred mile, balls to the wall advance, in dismal. It shows the Iraqi army to be totally inept. They should have killed five tanks at every creek and gully along the way. They should have forced the infantry to dismount every couple of miles. Personally, it appears to me that the Iraqi�s have very little faith in their equipment and even less ability to make good use of it. This is typical of a fighting force built on the Soviet model. When command and control is removed, the individual units do not have the ability to take the situation onto their own shoulders. They are trained to follow orders, and the development of local leadership is forbidden. This is to prevent the Army from being capable of independent operation that could be directed against the government. In the urban fight that will probably be fought in Baghdad, the same short coming will be evident. The Iraqi�s will never be able to mount an integrated defense without re-establishing command and control. In Somalia, the Skinnies were able to punish the Rangers because each fighter (can�t really call them solders) instinctively knew how to best contribute to the battle based on the local situation. They had never had the luxury of command and control in battle, so they had many trained field commanders, and an instinctive knowledge of how to fight a fluid battle in their urban back yard. This had been developed over a generation and a half of fighting. Many of these 20 year old Skinnies had 10 years of combat experience, with out ever having taken an order from anyone who was not close enough to give it verbally.

I find it strange that the Soviet model can train an irregular force to be self controlled at the local tactical level, but not allow the same freedom of action to the units in the regular Army. This is an obvious result of the mistrust that dictatorial governments have of the military forces under their command.